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In an earlier publication (Bronkhorst 2005) I have argued that Bha††oji D¥k∑ita was 
innovative in the philosophy of grammar. What I have tried to show there is that Bha††oji 
introduced a notion of spho†a which was essentially different from the spho†a that had been 
used by all his predecessors. Before Bha††oji the spho†a had been an ontological entity: a 
word (the pada-spho†a, [544] i.e., the spho†a which is the word), to take an example, is an 
existent thing, different from the sounds of which, we might naively think, it is constituted. 
With Bha††oji this changes: the spho†a is for him a semantic entity, and therefore primarily 
a meaning-bearer. An individual sound can therefore be a spho†a in the pre-Bha††oji sense 
(it is an existing entity that is different from the vibrations that seem to constitute it), but 
not in Bha††oji's sense (individual sounds have no meaning); when Bha††oji speaks of varˆa-
spho†as, he is as a result referring not to sounds, but to (meaningful) morphemes. 
 The point of departure of this paper is the conclusion of the earlier one: Bha††oji did 
indeed innovate in the field of the philosophy of grammar. The questions to be addressed at 
present are: (i) why did he innovate? and (ii) did he know that he innovated? 
 With regard to the second question we observe that Bha††oji went out of his way to 
show, unsuccessfully, that he had really nothing new to say.1 This by itself does not of 
course prove that he did not know that he was innovating, but if he did he kept it to himself. 
                                                
* This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (U.S.A.) under 
Grant No. 0135069. Most of the research was carried out during a stay at The Liguria Study Center 
for the Arts and Humanities in Bogliasco (Genoa), Italy, in the months of September and October 
2003. 
1 Cf. Bha††oji’s Vaiyåkaraˆa-matonmajjana 1a-b and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a’s comments thereon (VBhS, 
slightly different in VBh): bhå∑yåbdhe˙ ßabdakaustubha uddh®ta  ity uktis tu 
ßabdakaustubhoktånåm arthånåm ådhunikotprek∑itatvaniråsåya “‘The Íabdakaustubha is drawn 
from the ocean of the Bhå∑ya’: This is to dispel the notion that the topics recorded in the 
Íabdakaustubha have been invented by men of the present day” (tr. Joshi, 1995: 3). 
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We will return to this second question below, after a consideration of the first one. To 
answer the first question we will have a look at the intellectual context in which Bha††oji 
made his innovation. 
 I mention Bha††oji's intellectual context, not his social, political or economic 
context. The reason is not that the latter is unimportant. The contrary is true. However, 
intellectual traditions are not fully determined by social, political and economic factors. 
Intellectual traditions have a momentum of their own which can, in sufficiently favorable 
circumstances, largely determine how they will continue. In the present context it is 
essential to recall that certain changes, intellectual changes, can be brought about by 
unresolved issues within the tradition. The intellectual currents that interest us at present are 
currents of rational thought, by which I mean to say that they try to eliminate contradictions 
and look for coherence. This implies, among other things, that they take into account the 
criticism they are subjected to and that they are sensitive to different opinions. Social and 
political factors may determine whose criticism our thinkers are willing to listen to, and 
whose opinions they are willing to consider, if only perhaps to reject them; pandits of the 
time of Bha††oji were not keen to listen to criticism that came from without the Sanskrit 
tradition, nor were they ready to pay serious attention to opinions that were current outside 
their own group. But a great deal of criticism came from within the Sanskrit tradition, 
which harbored a variety of points of view. Scholars of this period compared their own 
positions with different ones current within the tradition. The differences constituted an 
ongoing challenge which new thinkers were free, or even encouraged, to take up. 
[545] 
 Some modern scholars may not take the presumed rationality of the traditions under 
consideration very seriously, and look upon it as a cover to hide the fact that no one in these 
traditions was ready to change his mind even on minor details. I do not share this extreme 
skepticism. I even think that those who hold such views are not likely to reach more than a 
very limited and superficial understanding of what was going on in the different ßåstras. 
Purely intellectual challenges had their role to play, and ambitious thinkers did take them 
up. Developments in the philosophy of grammar to which we will turn below will illustrate 
this. 
 
Which then was the intellectual challenge that Bha††oji D¥k∑ita — as explained by his 
nephew Kauˆ∂a Bha††a — was facing when he created his philosophy of grammar?2 The 
                                                
2 For a more detailed presentation of the following, see Bronkhorst, forthcoming. 
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answer lies in a development that was already a thousand years old at his time and had so 
far largely run its course in two schools of thought different from grammar. I am referring 
to the discussions about the understanding of the sentence that seem to have begun in the 
M¥måµså school of philosophy, had subsequently been taken up by Nyåya, and which 
came to be known as ßåbdabodha “verbal understanding.” 
 The philosophical writings of Bha††oji and his nephew Kauˆ∂a Bha††a must be seen 
as the defensive reaction of two grammarians who were not willing to tolerate the incorrect 
way the Naiyåyikas and M¥måµsakas used traditional grammar. Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a 
Bha††a protested against the misuse of Påˆini's grammar and tried to arrive at a way of 
exhaustively analyzing the meaning of sentences which is in agreement with the statements 
of Påˆini and, of course, those of his oldest commentators Kåtyåyana and Patañjali. In an 
important way Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a reasserted the authority of tradition, and of the 
Påˆinian grammatical tradition in particular. 
 The technique of sentence analysis called ßåbdabodha takes as its point of departure 
a clear definition of the meanings of the smallest meaningful elements of the sentence. 
There was plenty of disagreement about what precise meanings these smallest elements 
conveyed, but everyone agreed that the sentence expresses more than the sum of the 
meanings of its constituent morphemes. Somehow these meanings are structured in the 
resulting understanding of the sentence, so that the sentence meaning goes beyond the 
meanings of its constituent parts. Where does this extra meaning come from? 
 It is in answering this question that Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a could make good 
use of the discussions about the spho†a that had taken place before them, both inside and 
outside the grammatical tradition. In these earlier discussions the idea had been launched 
that a word is ontologically different from its “constituent” sounds, the sentence from its 
“constituent” words; these ontologically different entities were called spho†a. Bha††oji and 
Kauˆ∂a Bha††a were less interested in ontological questions, so they represented these 
earlier positions in the following modified way: The pada-spho†a, i.e. the word, is a 
different meaning-bearer from the “constituent” varˆa-spho†as, the morphemes; and the 
våkya-spho†a, i.e. the sentence, is a different meaning-[546]bearer from the “constituent” 
pada-spho†as, the words. The expressive power of the word is not, therefore, merely the 
accumulation of the meanings of its morphemes; and the meaning of the sentence is not 
merely the accumulation of the meanings of its words, but has its own, different meaning. 
The spho†a theory, as revamped by Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a, provided a perfect 
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justification for the complex and structured meaning, different from the sum of the 
meanings of the constituent parts, which these grammarians assigned to the sentence.3 
 In order to further elucidate the issues at stake, one can do no better than cite the 
relevant passage from S. D. Joshi's Spho†anirˆaya (1967: 142-144). We read there: 
 
The Naiyåyikas uphold that words denote isolated meanings and the relational 
meaning is communicated by the tåtparya function or saµsargamaryådå. According 
to them, the individual words convey their own meaning through the primary 
function (abhidhå) and the syntactically unified meaning is conveyed by virtue of 
the tåtparya function (purport of words). 
 The Bhå††a school of the M¥måµsakas maintains that words denote isolated 
meanings, and syntactically related meaning is conveyed by the secondary function 
(lak∑aˆå). ... The Bhå††a school and the Nyåya school differ from each other in 
accepting ... different mediums through which the syntactic meaning is conveyed. 
[But] both the schools admit that the sentence-meaning is [something] over and 
above the primary meaning of words. ... 
 ... the våkyaßakti theory of the grammarians assumes that the entire sentence 
is an indivisible unit, and its meaning is also an undivided whole which has no parts. 
... For example, when the sentence n¥lo gha†a˙ is paraphrased n¥låbhinno gha†a˙ (“A 
jar non-different from the blue thing”), the meaning “non-different” is [as much 
part] of the sentence-meaning as ... “jar” and “blue”. 
 
It is in this way that our grammarians, by using the spho†a theory, could avoid postulating 
functions such as tåtparya or lak∑aˆå, and yet arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the 
sentence-meaning. The spho†a theory was thus used to solve a problem that accompanied 
ßåbdabodha. This solution was a grammarians’ solution, but the problem was common to 
all who were interested in this kind of analysis. The Naiyåyikas and M¥måµsakas had 
proposed other solutions to bridge the gap between the meaning of the sentence and the 
[547] meanings of its constituent parts.4 This gap was real according to those other thinkers 
and therefore had to be bridged. The grammarians’ solution was more elegant in that it 
denied the importance, or even the existence, of this gap: Since these grammarians 
considered the sentence to be an expressive unit by itself, they believed that it would be a 
mistake to think that a sentence even expressed the meanings of its constituent words. 
                                                
3 A similar argument could of course be made for the compound (cf. VBhS ed. ÓnÓßr p. 42 l. 9-10 
[1st ed. p. 37 l. 7], ed. ChPS p. 384, ed. KSS p. 304, ed. Pr p. 380, Das, 1990: 140 l. 17-18: samåse 
… åvaßyikaiva samudåyasya … vißi∑†årthe ßakti˙), yet there is no such thing as a samåsaspho†a for 
Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a. See further Biswal 1995: 40 ff. 
4 See also Kunjunni Raja 1963: 191 ff. The sub-school of M¥måµså linked to the name of 
Prabhåkara denied that a sentence expresses more than the sum of the meanings of its constituent 
parts; for this position, known as anvitåbhidhånavåda, see Kunjunni Raja 1963: 197 ff.; Joshi 1967: 
146 ff. 
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 Our grammarians were not totally original in postulating the sentence as a single 
meaning bearer. Bhart®hari had said similar things.5 However, Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a 
were no longer interested in ontological issues, so that, in spite of lip-service to 
predecessors, their different spho†as were meaning bearers. It was convenient for them to 
know that the grammatical tradition had long maintained that sentences are different from 
their constituent words, and words different from their constituent morphemes, for it 
justified certain steps in their adoption of the ßåbdabodha procedure into grammar. 
 
Having seen how and why Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a innovated, we have to address the 
question why they denied doing so? Were they incapable of seeing that a semantic spho†a is 
not quite the same as an ontological spho†a? Did they lack the historical sense to see that 
their predecessors were guided by questions and concerns different from their own? Did 
they fail to see that their own semantic concerns had succeeded and replaced the 
ontological concerns of those who preceded them? 
 In a certain sense these questions must no doubt be answered in the affirmative. At 
the same time, answers which base themselves on certain presumed intellectual 
shortcomings of the people concerned are not very satisfactory, and most probably 
incorrect. What is primarily at stake is not the intellect of one or two individuals, but the 
culture of which they were part. Our question must therefore be reformulated: What in the 
culture of these two individuals made them overlook the fact that a semantic spho†a is not 
quite the same as an ontological spho†a? What made them fail to see that their own 
semantic concerns had succeeded and replaced the ontological concerns of their 
predecessors? 
 At this point it is tempting to recall some remarks made by Sheldon Pollock (1985: 
515): “[I]f in certain areas the shastric paradigm did encourage — or enforce — a certain 
stasis ..., elsewhere Indian cultural history in the classical and medieval period is crowded 
with exciting discovery and innovation ... These are not, however, perceived to be such; 
they are instead viewed, through the inverting lens of ideology, as renovation and recovery 
...” Is it possible that Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a believed that their spho†a somehow [548] 
corresponded to an “original” spho†a? Did they think they had “recovered” something? Did 
they see themselves as being part of some kind of Renaissance? Did they consider their new 
                                                
5 Cf. Vkp 2.42: sambandhe sati yat tv anyad ådhikyam upajåyate / våkyårtham eva taµ pråhur 
anekapadasaµßrayam // “Was aber, wenn der Zusammenhang [der Wörter im Satze hergestellt] ist, 
an Weiterem hinzukommt, das allein nennen [diese Lehrer] den auf mehreren Wörtern beruhenden 
Sinn des Satzes” (tr. Rau 2002: 52). Cf. Kunjunni Raja 1963: 224 ff. 
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interpretation of the spho†a merely a rephrasing in modern terminology of some older truth 
of the ancients?6 
 There are two sides to the questions here asked. On the one hand there can be no 
doubt that our authors knew that they were reacting to and participating in developments 
that were relatively new. The kind of sentence analysis they were dealing with had received 
a new impetus from a school of thought that was known, also in their time, as “the new 
Nyåya” (Navyanyåya). In an important sense our two authors must have been aware that 
they were participating in new developments which had never taken place before. As a 
result renovation and recovery cannot explain all the contributions they made to the 
philosophy of language. On the other hand, there is a clear tendency in their writings to 
hold on to, and where necessary to recover, the teachings of tradition. 
 We do not need to postulate that in the opinion of our authors all problems had 
already been solved before their time, so that their sole task was to recover the earlier 
solutions. We can safely abandon this idea, and yet accept their complete reliance on 
tradition. The traditionalism of our authors rather implies that they were convinced that the 
tools and concepts provided by tradition were adequate, not only for certain tasks, but for 
all possible tasks in which they might play a role; this also includes new tasks that may 
have never presented themselves before. Påˆini's semantic indications were perhaps not 
formulated for the purpose of ßåbdabodha, but they are — i.e., have to be — more than 
adequate in this context, too. Therefore the spho†a as made known by tradition must also be 
such as to be useful in this new context. In the opinion of our two authors, although the 
tools and concepts handed down by tradition may not constitute the whole truth, they 
certainly are the elements with whose help we may hope to reach it. 
 The historically oriented reader will object that the spho†a before Bha††oji had a 
different function from the one he assigned to it. It seems likely that Bha††oji did not so 
much think in terms of function, but rather in terms of a transhistorical reality; as a result he 
did not think historically either. The spho†a was a transhistorical concept provided by 
tradition, so that also new problems, not yet known to his predecessors, had to be solved 
with its help. If this was axiomatic for him, it is not surprising that he forced the concept 
somewhat where that was necessary for his purposes. Did Bha††oji know that he forced the 
                                                
6 This last question is based on the quotation from Jayanta Bha††a's Nyåyamañjar¥ (introduction, 
verse 8) cited by Pollock, in Matilal's translation: “How can we discover any new fact or truth? One 
should consider novelty only in rephrasing the older truths of the ancients in modern terminology.” 
(kuto vå nËtanaµ vastu vayam utprek∑ituµ k∑amå˙ / vacovinyåsavaicitryamåtram atra vicåryatåm 
//) 
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concept? Unfortunately it is not possible to interrogate him on this subject, but I consider it 
likely that he would have responded that the classical spho†a concept had to be interpreted 
more widely (and had been meant by its originators to be interpreted more widely), 
precisely because [549] otherwise it would not solve the new difficulties encountered in 
connection with ßåbdabodha. From his point of view — in which tradition reveals to us 
elements of a transhistorical reality, without claim to completeness — this would make 
perfect sense. 
 The traditional thinker and the historically oriented outsider will in this way 
interpret the same events differently. Both might agree that Bha††oji and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a 
were caught up in a developmental stream that had begun some centuries earlier, and in 
which they could only try to stay afloat. Staying afloat in an intellectual stream means 
adapting one's views so as to keep them coherent, and reacting to the challenges that 
present themselves. To the outsider, such adaptations and reactions may look original or 
innovative. The traditional thinker would disagree, for all he tries to do is proceed in such a 
manner as to preserve tradition in its full authority. From Bha††oji's point of view, the 
spho†a he talks about may perhaps not be found in the writings of his predecessors, yet the 
interpretation he gives to it must have been the one intended by the ancient sages, for only 
thus can the spho†a play a useful role in the new developments that were taking place at his 
time. Bha††oji recovered the correct interpretation of the spho†a in order to steer the new 
developments of his time in the right direction, i.e., in agreement with ancient tradition. We 
do not know for sure whether Bha††oji was aware of the fact that his spho†a was different 
from the one of his predecessors, but if he did, this, I submit, is how he would explain this 
difference. 
 
For the outside observer it is important to keep in mind that the current in which Bha††oji 
and Kauˆ∂a Bha††a found themselves was an intellectual current. The existence of this 
current was, of course, made possible by features of the surrounding landscape. The 
influence of the surrounding landscape on those who find themselves in the midst of the 
river is, at least in cases like the one just considered, indirect and of relatively secondary 
importance. However, earthquakes may change the surrounding landscape beyond 
recognition, and bring it about that existing currents lose much of their volume, change 
their course or disappear altogether. This did not happen at the time of Bha††oji D¥k∑ita. It 
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was going to happen, not so very long after him. This coming earthquake is however 
beyond the scope of the present paper.7  
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